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The Impact of International Influence on Microbanks’ 
Performance: A Global Survey 
 
1. Introduction 
Microfinance is the supply of banking services to micro-enterprises and poor families 
(Helms 2006). Christen et al. (2004) reports that as many as 500 million poor persons benefit 
from access to savings services, and between 125 million and 150 million clients have an 
estimated $25 billion in outstanding loans with microfinance providers (Financial Times, 
2008). The development enhancing aspects of microfinance was recognized when the Nobel 
Peace Prize was given to Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank in 2006. However, relatively 
little is known about what drives the performance of microfinance institutions (Cull et al. 
2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2009) – or what we label microbanks. Specifically, this study 
addresses the effects from internationalization on microbanks’ performance.   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the microfinance industry is subject to strong cross-
border influence from international capital providers (by donors, by lenders, or by equity 
holders), international knowledge transfers (best practices, policy guidelines, strategic 
planning, software etc.), and extensive international networks - such as Accion International, 
Women’s World Banking, Finca or Opportunity International. In fact, our data from 379 
microbanks in 73 countries shows that as much as 38% of the microbanks have an 
international initiator, 41% have international commercial debt, 51% have international 
subsidized debt, 24% have at least one international director1, and 33% are members of a 
recognized international network. However, the performance impact of such international 
influence has not been addressed by existing research. Within the microfinance industry there 
                                                 
1 An international director is defined as a supervisory board member (non-executive) that is a citizen of different 
country than the legal home of the microbank. 
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is often a perception that international influence on microbanks is “to accelerate innovative 
domestic market solutions” (C-GAP 2006, p. viii). This implies that as microbanks develop 
and mature one should expect that international influence would be reduced (Helms, 2006). 
Thus, “exit strategies” are often high on international investors’ and international donors’ 
agendas, and the construction of national, e.g. non-international, microbanks is by many 
considered an objective in itself.   
Existing research on microfinance has mostly dealt with the impact from accessing 
banking services, the economics of group lending and policy issues on how to build and 
regulate an inclusive financial sector (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Cross-
country issues related to the transfer of funds, knowledge sharing, and network access, are 
new to the literature. We believe decades of international business research can be used to 
better understand the international economics of microbanks, and the managerial implications 
of such knowledge.   
International business research shows that internationalization tends to produce firms 
with higher performance (e.g., Morck and Young, 1991; Tallman and Li, 1996; Wagner, 
2004), however, after overcoming internationalization barriers. Commonly there are four 
broad arguments for the high performance of the internationalized firm; (i) economics of scale 
– especially knowledge (e.g., Dunning, 2000; UNCTAD, 2003), (ii) reduced cross-border 
agency costs through internalized (within firm) markets (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 1998),  
(iii) lower cost of capital from international funds (e.g., Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 
2000; Hearn et.al, forthcoming; Oxelheim et al., 2001) and (iv) better corporate governance 
(e.g., Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003; Coffee, 2002). We suggest that internationally influenced 
microbanks can potentially benefit from the same kind of advantages – after overcoming the 
liability of a foreign origin (similar to the International Business research reference to the 
“liability of foreignness” of a multinational firm – see Dunning, 1977).   
Whereas international business research typically concentrates on multinational firms 
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reaching “out” from a domestic base, in this study, we focus on the individual microbank 
entity – as it typically reaches “North” for resources and support from developed countries. 
This implies that our perspective is one of the “global South”: How can a microbank in a 
developing country benefit from internationalization? The focus of this study is firstly on the 
financial performance of the microbank – being measured in terms of (1) real Return on 
Assets (ROA)2, (2) Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS), and (3) Financial Self-Sufficiency 
(FSS). We argue that there are inherent close relationships between these indicators – such 
that we focus on the joint effect of these performance measures. Secondly, since microfinance 
most commonly has a dual nature, one being financial, and the other developmental, we also 
include measures for social performance– or as it is commonly referred to, outreach. We 
apply three measures that attempt to combine the multidimensional nature of social 
performance: (1) outreach to the poorest customers measured in terms of average size of 
loans, (2) outreach to women as these are considered a main mission of microfinance 
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005), and (3) outreach to rural areas which is also a 
major concern in the microfinance industry (Helms, 2006). Specifically, we are interested in 
how the internationalization influences affect both social and financial performance of the 
microbank since recent evidence (Hermes et al., forthcoming) has shown that a tradeoff 
between the financial and the social performance exists. In this paper, we pose the question of 
whether or not a microbank’s international linkages account for a part of this tradeoff. If this 
is the case, we expect the international explanatory variables to be differently related to the 
financial and the social performance. 
This paper is divided into six parts. Following the introduction, which has reviewed 
the main motivation for this study, part two focuses on the nature of international influence in 
the microfinance industry. The presented and tested model of internationalization’s affect on 
                                                 
2
 Debt/Equity levels in microbanks differ considerably. Comparison of economic performance is therefore best measured using ROA and not 
ROE.  
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microbanks’ performance is shown in section three – with explicit hypotheses being put 
forward. The research methodology and data is presented in section four, and the empirical 
findings presented in section five. Finally, we present our main conclusions - as well as 
implications for policy makers - in section six. We also conclude with a discussion of further 
research, and the inherent limitations of this study.   
 
2. International influence in the microfinance industry 
Internationalization is rather extensive in the microfinance industry. There are 
international conferences (such as the Microcredit Summits and the Inter-American Forum on 
Microenterprise) and international, web-based, microfinance information platforms. For 
example, Mix Market (www.mixmarket.org) seeks to facilitate international information 
exchange between microbanks investors, donors and different service providers. In March 
2008 www.mixmarket.org listed 1157 microbanks in 99 countries, 99 international lenders 
and 165 market facilitators such as rating agencies, networks and support service providers. 
Besides, the web-based hub www.microfinancegateway.org lists 7250 documents, 446 
international consultants, 135 vacant jobs and 40 upcoming events as of May, 2008. 
Today all major multilateral development organizations, like the IMF, the World 
Bank, The Asian Bank, the EU, the UN and the Inter American Development Bank dedicate 
funding and research to microfinance. Specialized agencies like the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (www.cgap.org) provide the industry with specific guidelines and issue policy 
recommendations. The international recognition for microfinance as a development tool 
culminated with the UN declaring 2005 as the year of Microcredit and the Nobel’s peace prize 
being awarded to Mohammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank in 2006.  
Increasingly microfinance is becoming an attractive investment opportunity (Walter 
and Krauss, 2008). Interestingly, a number of international banks such as Citibank, HSBC, 
Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, ABN Ambro and Barclays are engaged in microfinance 
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activities and in 2006 held a portfolio in microbanks of more than 500 million US dollars 
(ING, 2006). For example, international holding companies, such as Procredit Holding with a 
total portfolio of nearly 400 million invested in 22 national microbanks around the globe, are 
emerging (Reille and Forster, 2008). Between 2004 and 2006 the total stock of foreign capital 
investment in microfinance more than tripled to US$ 4 billion, and 40 specialized 
international investment funds have been established during the last couple of years (Reille 
and Forster, 2008).  
Other examples of international influence are the many networks that provide their 
members with knowledge and information, such as; FINCA, Opportunity International, and 
Women’s World Banking. Another example of the internationalization of the industry, is the 
global success of business planning software such as Microfin (www.microfin.com) used in a 
large number of countries. Another very recent global initiative that has picked up 
considerable interest is www.mftransparency.org, an international initiative for fair and 
transparent pricing in the microfinance industry. 
Modern microfinance, as pioneered by Mohammad Yunus the founder of Grameen 
Bank in 1976, was born in a philanthropic development culture. Historically, the focus was on 
the build-up of local capacity and the gradual exiting of international founders and donors. 
Still, several in the microfinance community consider international participation in 
microbanks to be transition phenomena. In their view, the ultimate goal is to build local 
microbanks as an integrated part of the national financial system – with local owners and 
focus on relations with domestic stakeholders. This view is articulated by Hendricks (2003), 
page 78: 
[..] a bilateral donor project is expected to design a microfinance institution or 
program, to build the necessary capacity, and, when the project ends, to have 
established an operation that has developed enough momentum to achieve financial 
sustainability on its own. 
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Thus, to some the inflow of international capital and expertise - increasingly with profit 
motives - is a threat. Such arguments are commonly based on ideology or politics- and not on 
empirical facts. So far, few have asked the question to what degree international participation 
influences microbanks’ performance or customer satisfaction. This paper aims at filling this 
void by bringing in empirical evidence on how international stakeholders influence 
microbanks’ performance. 
 
3. How Internationalization Might Influence Microbanks’ Performance 
 
The Model 
The ongoing process of internationalizing financial markets offers microbanks greater 
financial flexibility. This provides a microbank – just like international oriented firms have 
done previously (e.g., Oxelheim et al, 1998; Stulz, 1999) – with the ability to increase the 
availability and reduce the cost of capital. However, it requires that the microbank is able to 
efficiently overcome cross-country information gaps and the ability to monitor/control these 
international exchanges.  
The theoretical foundation for this study comes from agency theory and resource 
based theory. Agency theory emphasizes that when ownership and management is separate – 
then incentives and control are needed to induce managers (agents) to maximize profits - or 
other organizational goals – such as social performance. Specifically, boards play an 
important monitoring role in order to reduce agency costs in both for-profit and non-profit 
firms (Fama and Jensen 1983; Dalton et al, 1998; Dalton et al, 1999; Speckbacher 2008). For 
example, in relation to monitoring the microbank  - an international director can take on a 
special independent role as he/she is less part of vested domestic interests. International debt 
is another very different governance “mechanism” that can facilitate better monitoring. Such 
debt can potentially reduce microbanks’ agency costs by forcing the microbank to be more 
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performance oriented.   
The resource based theory of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991) highlights how firm 
specific resources are the cornerstone of corporate competitiveness. This has also been shown 
in the context of international business (e.g., Peng, 2001) – and we argue is applicable to 
microbanks. Furthermore, a key issue is how internationalization affects the microbank’s 
ability to effectively deploy resources. Specifically, past literature (e.g., Hall 1992) has 
highlighted the importance of resources and capabilities such as; the ability to raise external 
capital, organizational culture, use of managerial talent, and a good reputation among 
employees and other stakeholders. In this study, we specifically look at four kinds of 
resources and capabilities (international initiator, international debt, international board 
membership, and international network membership), and we argue that microbanks with 
such resource capabilities will outperform microbanks without such access.  
This study is focused on microbanks’ performance – the dependent variable. Since 
microbanks operate in an environment where social as well as financial performance is 
highlighted (Economist, 2008; Morduch 1999) – we chose to address both aspects of 
performance3. Our three main indicators of financial performance (return on assets, 
operational self-sufficiency, and financial self-sufficiency) attempt to capture the complexity 
of financial performance within the microfinance industry. Also, as previously argued, most 
microbanks state a dual mission; being financially sustainable and “serving the poor”. Similar 
to Cull et al. (2007) and Mersland and Strøm (2009), we therefore include average 
outstanding loan as a proxy to measure to what degree the microbank reach out to poor 
customers. We also look at the focus on woman (labeled gender) – as this is an indication of 
their focus on servicing female clients, and finally we capture the relative focus on rural areas 
(labeled rural). These three indicators need also to be understood in the specific microfinance 
                                                 
3 In an additional unreported model we also control for social performance when regressing financial 
performance against the independent variables (and visa-a-versa). However, this did not have a significant effect 
on our results. 
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context that typically microbanks that offer smaller loans and have a focus on women and 
rural areas gives an indication that the microbank focuses on the poorest client segments 
(Bhatt and Tang, 2001). Based on the above discussion, we apply a model of microbank 
performance that incorporates various dimensions of international influence, microbank 
specific control variables from past research, and country control variables.   
 
Microbank performance = f (international initiator, international commercial debt, 
international subsidized debt, international director, international network 
membership + microbank specific control variables + country control variables) 
 
Hypotheses 
We identify four distinct sources of international influence within microbanks; international 
knowledge access (International initiator), international funds access (international 
commercial and subsidized debt), international monitoring (international board member), and 
international affiliation/networks.  
Having an international founding agency/firm (initiator) will most likely affect the 
microbank’s ability to access knowledge – both in terms of practices/skills and in terms of 
hardware. The resource based theory of the firm highlights how organizational specific 
history is an important source of uniqueness – and potentially competitiveness. Given the 
scale economy of knowledge and the fact that agency costs are reduced with common 
ownership (if shareholder owned) or common identity (non-profit) – we expect that 
microbanks with an international initiator will have higher performance. This performance 
might take the form of higher financial performance and/or social performance.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between having an international initiator 
and microbanks’ performance  
 
 
The corporate governance literature highlights how debt is a powerful disciplining 
“mechanism” – particularly related to corporations with free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). For 
microbanks – this is the case when they reach self sufficiency or have excessive funding from 
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donors. We argue that agency costs are reduced when microbanks have undertaken 
commercial dept (H2a) – or subsidized debt (H2b). Based on the resource-based theory, we 
see international debt as an important indicator of a microbank’s superior ability to raise 
capital. Since most of the providers of commercial funding to microfinance pursue a “double 
bottom line” (Reille and Forster, 2008), we argue that debt has the same kind of effects on 
social performance as on financial performance. We therefore suggest that both commercial 
debt and subsidized debt provide stronger monitoring, i.e. lower agency costs, which leads to 
higher social and/or financial performance.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relation between international commercial debt and 
microbanks’ performance  
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relation between international subsidized debt and 
microbanks’ performance 
 
 
 
Past agency theory-based research suggests that a firm’s performance depends on the 
monitoring and decision-making undertaken by its board of directors (e.g., Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, from a resource-based view, an international board member can 
provide unique capabilities (such as microbank experience from other countries) and 
resources (easier to get international funding). Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) found that 
internationalization of boards of publicly traded firms enhances firm performance – as these 
international board members facilitate the transfer of value enhancing corporate governance 
practices. We argue that the same kind of processes can take place in microbanks. 
International board members might enhance the microbanks’ ability to transfer skills and 
competencies – thus providing better access to unique resources for the microbank – in 
relation to mere domestic oriented microbanks. Thus, we argue that international board 
members can reduce agency costs and facilitate higher microbank performance – either as 
financial performance and/or social performance.  
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relation between international board membership 
and microbanks’ performance  
 
 
Being a member of a prestigious or recognized international network – such as the 
Women’s World Banking - can be a major step in a microbank’s development. We suggest 
that such a membership provides a quality screening that carries with it the potential for 
reduced monitoring costs in relation to the microbank’s interaction with other organizations. 
If a microbank “misbehaves” – it could potentially be excluded – such that membership 
provides a cap on opportunism. For the microbank, this can facilitate cost effective transfers 
of know-how, technology, and even funds. In relation to the resource-based theory, we argue 
that an international network membership provides the microbank with unique access to 
resources and capabilities.  Since international networks in microfinance pursue dual 
objectives (Isern and Cook, 2004), we suggest that the reduced monitoring (agency) costs due 
to a international network membership can enhance microbank performance – with respect to 
either or both the financial and the social performance.  
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relation between international affiliation/network 
membership and microbanks’ performance 
 
 
Control variables 
 We apply microbank control variables that are typically included in recent 
microfinance performance research, such as Cull et al (2007) and Mersland and Strøm 
(2008). We include the following organization-specific (microbank) control variables: 
microbank experience (years), credit methodology, ownership type, assets (size), regulation, 
portfolio at risk and average loan (in the financial performance regression). Furthermore, 
given the high degree of variation in the economic environment of our 73 country sample, we 
use a number of country variables, similar to Mersland and Strøm (2010), in order to reduce 
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misspecification of microbanks’ performance. This includes the country’s inflation, GDP per 
capita adjusted for purchasing power parity effects, GDP growth rate, current account balance 
as a percentage of GDP, and the economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. 
Furthermore, we include regional dummies (see Table 1) as well as year dummies in our 
regressions in order to further streamline the analysis.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
The dataset is a collection of 379 microbanks that have been chosen to be assessed by 
one of the five leading rating agencies specialized in microfinance: MicroRate, Microfinanza, 
Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. Thus, microbanks’ decision to become rated by an 
international rating agent already indicates that the microbank in this study is internationally 
oriented. Comparisons of the rating methodologies applied by the five rating agencies reveal 
no major differences on all applied variables in this study.  
The five microfinance rating agencies differ in their emphasis and the extent of 
provided information. Thus, there are a different number of observations related to different 
variables. When needed, all entries in the dataset have been annualized and dollarized using 
official exchange rates at the given time. The rating reports, that represent the basis for the 
constructed database, are from 2001 to 2008. The data set comprises microbanks from 73 
countries. In addition to data from the rating year, we also have up to five additional firm-year 
observations per microbank prior to the rating year event.  
The dataset has a certain sample selection bias, since only rated microbanks enter. 
They represent microbanks with the intention to search out international funding and practice 
microfinance in a business oriented manner. We will argue that using microbanks that are 
internationally rated has at least four advantages compared to data from commonly used 
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databases of microbanks, such as Mix-market (www.mixmarket.org). First, raw data (the 
rating reports) are publicly available at www.ratingfund2.org, second, several more variables, 
especially variables relevant to the study of corporate governance and internationalization, are 
available from Ratingfund. Third, the data is not self-reported, as in Mix-market, but collected 
and verified by a third party (the rating agency). Fourth, a bias towards large microbanks is 
avoided. Mix-market data includes most of the very large microbanks, whereas the rated 
microbanks used in this study have a wider distribution in terms of size. Several, but not all, 
of the largest microbanks in the world do not undertake microfinance rating reports because 
they instead undergo traditional rating from agencies like the Standard & Poor’s. The size bias 
in the Mix-market data, is therefore smaller in our dataset (Table 2). The mean difference 
between the Mix-market and our rating report mean is, however, moderate (US$ 1026 versus 
US$ 942), and the median difference is small and reversed (US$ 456 versus US$ 479). Taken 
together, we suggest that a dataset built on rating reports is more representative for the 
industry than the Mix-market sample.   
 
Table 2 about there  
 
The rated microbanks we analyze have a number of legal and organizational forms; but three 
forms stand out: they are non-profit organizations, member-based cooperatives, or shareholder 
controlled firms with various degrees of profit motivation (Isern et al., 2003). In addition, the 
universe of microfinance providers consists also of other organizational and legal forms. For 
example, throughout the world, there are a large number of informal rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAs) that have been initiated by the poor (Ambec and Treich, 2007, 
Bouman, 1995) or have been promoted by donors (Allen, 2006). At the same time, it is also 
common to see government ownership of different types of rural, agriculture, development, 
and postal banks (Christen et al., 2004). However, none of these institutions are formal private 
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suppliers of microfinance services with an interest in becoming rated by a third party. 
Moreover, our approach also implies that we exclude numerous small savings and credit 
cooperatives, and development programs that offer microcredit solely as a welfare service 
(non-sustainable). We argue that the 379 microbanks in our dataset represent commercial and 
professionally oriented institutions that have decided to be publicly rated with the motivation 
to improve access to funding, benchmark themselves against others, and to increase 
transparency (see www.ratingfund.org). 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.  
 
Table 3 about there  
 
The average financial performance (Return On Assets) of the microbanks is slightly positive, 
at 0.5%. This reflects that a large number of microbanks are not financially self sufficient, i.e., 
they do not pay their true cost of capital. However, one needs to pay attention to the ROA 
standard deviation of 12.5% - which reflects the large variation in financial returns. The 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and the financial self-sufficiency (FSS) give more details. 
OSS is higher than 1.0, indicating that the microbanks on average are able to meet their 
obligations, but when adjusted for low-interest loans and inflation in the FSS measure, we see 
that the surveyed microbanks are not financially sustainable in the long term. International 
support may cover at least part of the shortfall in necessary income. On the social 
performance side, the average loan size is US$ 942. A median of US$ 479 and a high standard 
deviation (US$ 2252) indicate that the average loan’s distribution is skewed heavily to the low 
end (more small loans, but with a long tail at the high end of large loans). The social 
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performance measures, gender and rural, are both categorical, gender is a dummy and rural 
has three categories, see table 1. These are only recorded at the rating year, therefore the low 
number of observations. The percentage of microbanks biasing their loans towards women is 
43.8. The rural variable is symmetrically distributed, as about 30% give loans mainly to urban 
customers, 28% to rural, and the rest to a mixture of the two. 
 The various performance measures as well as the international explanatory variables 
may be related, so that regressing on all variables individually really brings no extra benefits. 
We run a correlation analysis to check if multicollinearity between the international 
explanatory variables are a concern, and also if the performance measures are duplicates. 
 
Table 4 about there 
 First, we look at the correlations among the financial performance variables in the two 
panels. Obviously, since they are all measures of financial returns, the correlations between 
the financial performance variables in panel A are very high and strongly significant. 
However, since they measure financial returns differently, with and without subsidies (OSS 
and FSS) and related to size (ROA,) we include all three measures in the analyses. In contrast, 
the correlations between the social performance variables in panel A are low and only 
significant in one case (average loan and gender). Thus, the social performance variables 
measure different aspects of outreach, and this indicates that social performance is really 
multi-dimensional. A further noteworthy difference is that the financial performance variables 
are only related to one explanatory international variable (commercial debt), but that gender is 
related to several international variables. Last, an interesting difference between panel A and 
B exists in the fact that commercial debt is positively related to financial performance, but that 
subsidized debt is positively related to gender. An interpretation is that commercial debt acts 
to discipline financial management, but that subsidized debt has a stronger bias towards social 
performance. This could be an example of a trade-off effect between financial and social 
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performance (Hermes et al. forthcoming; Morduch, 2000). Significant result may, however, 
change when all variables are run together.  
 Now we turn to the question of multicollinearity among the international explanatory 
variables. Significant correlations could indicate a multicollinearity problem. However, the 
correlation coefficients are rather low. Kennedy (2008, p. 196) holds that correlations need to 
be in the area of 0.8 to 0.9 to detect collinearity among two variables. None of the correlation 
coefficients in Table 4 are of this magnitude. However, the method does not detect 
collinearity among three or more variables. Thus, we may have a collinearity problem for the 
full set of international variables. Common ways to deal with this are to use data reduction 
techniques or to run regressions with only one or a few explanatory variables at a time. In this 
paper, we choose the latter procedure in (unreported) robustness checks. In all, low 
correlations among the international explanatory variables warrants the inclusion of all in 
regressions. However, the many significant correlations are a warning signal that 
multicollinearity problems may arise when all are included simultaneously. We solve this by 
running different specifications of estimations to check how stable coefficients are.  
 
5.2. Regression methodology 
We want to perform single-equation regressions for each financial and social 
performance variable, and system regressions first for all financial and then for all social 
performance variables. The regression structure is further complicated by two facts. First, 
some dependent variables (ROA, OSS, FSS, and average loan) are continuous and some are 
categorical (rural, and gender). Second, the data is panel data since we have up to six years of 
observations among the 379 microbanks, and we want to exploit this advantage as well as 
possible. 
Let us look at the single-equation regressions first, and begin with the continuous 
variables. The single-equation regressions give a way to compare results to past research (e.g., 
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Mersland and Strøm, 2009). The financial performance variables and average loan are all 
continuous variables. Among the international explanatory variables only the share of 
international directors is continuous, distributed between 0 and 1, and the rest are dummy 
variables that we assume are also time invariant4. Thus, we need to use the random effect 
model using the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation methodology (Greene, 2008) to 
implement the regression for the financial performance variables and for average loan. The 
other social performance variables are categorical. Gender and international initiator are 
dummy variables, and rural has three categories. For the categorical variables we perform 
logistic regressions for gender and international initiator, and an ordered logistic regression 
for the rural variable. Since the assumptions for panel data estimation of logistic regressions 
are rather stringent (Greene, 2008 p. 796-806) and “…is fraught with difficulties and 
unconventional estimation problems” in Greene’s words, we pool the sample. In the logistic 
regressions year dummies (Woolridge, 2002) are included in order to reduce time 
heterogeneity. The single-equation regressions are shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
Now we turn to the system regressions. System estimation is applicable when we have 
related measures of an underlying true variable that depends upon a set of explanatory 
variables. Table 4 shows that this is the situation here, especially among the social 
performance variables. Given the high correlation between the financial performance 
variables, system estimation should be superfluous. Yet, FSS is subsidy adjusted, and may 
thus give different information. Furthermore, interesting contrasts between the financial and 
social performance variables appear when both are run as system regressions. We use panel 
data estimation with the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methodology (Greene, 2008 p. 
267-272), a procedure that takes account of possible correlations among the dependent 
variables. To do so, we assume that the categorical dependent variables are continuous. The 
                                                 
4
 The variable is recorded only in the rating year. However, the microbank is not likely to change its policy on outreach from 
one year to another. 
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procedure gives the correct sign and significance level, but coefficients cannot be interpreted 
as in a logistic regression. We perform a Breusch-Pagan test to check if the residuals in the 
SUR regression are independent, and also an exclusion test that all international variables 
have zero coefficients.  
The correlations in Table 4 show that multicollinearity among the international 
variables are a potential problem in our regressions. We confront this problem by running 
several regressions, first regressions where one or a subset of variables are run (not reported) 
and then a regression containing all variables. In unreported regressions we observe that 
significant variables’ coefficient estimates are similar across regressions, and thus 
multicollinearity problems are a small concern. 
 
5.3. Econometric findings 
Tables 5 and 6 report our findings when each measure of the dependent variable is 
taken separately. Tables 7 and 8 give results for joint estimations of the dependent variable; 
with respect to financial performance and social performance. We emphasize the effects 
shown by the joint estimation; however, we will first briefly discuss the findings from the 
single measure tests (Table 5 and 6).  
Table 5 shows that having an international initiator is significant and positively 
affecting ROA and OSS, but does not significantly affect FSS. Thus, being initiated by an 
international organization provides better financial performance. However, when adjusting for 
subsidies (FSS), the effect vanishes indicating that microbanks that have an international 
initiator receive more subsidies than other microbanks. We do not see any other systematic 
effects on these single measures of performance – with only the exception being that 
international directors significantly reduce OSS. This effect might be explained by the fact 
that such directors bring in a culture of higher costs (Mersland and Strøm, 2009). 
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Table 5 about there  
 
Table 6 reveals that microbanks’ internationalization significantly affects social 
performance with respect to gender bias (international initiator, international subsidized debt, 
and international network membership) and rural focus (international network membership). 
Thus, being internationally initiated tends to increase the microbank’s bias in preferring 
women as customers. Internationally subsidized loan have the same effect. Last, being an 
international network member has two significant effects upon outreach. The variable 
indicates that outreach decreases with the rural market variable, and increases again with 
gender bias.  
 
Table 6 about there  
 
Now we turn to Table 7, that shows the financial variables when all measures of 
financial performance are regressed together in a SUR regression. We notice that the same 
results for both ROA and OSS are obtained in Table 5, that is, being internationally initiated 
tends to improve financial performance, but results are not significant with respect to subsidy 
adjusted values (FSS). Having an international director reduces financial performance. 
 
Table 7 about there  
 
In Table 8 we run the three social performance variables together in a SUR regression. 
In contrast to Table 7, we now obtain several more significant results – and we argue that a 
joint estimation is also more theoretically correct – as we capture the joint effect on 
performance. Thus, while the financial performance measures used in this study are mostly 
uni-dimensional (similar results in Tables 5 and 7), the indicators we use for social 
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performance are multi-dimensional (different results in Tables 6 and 8) and must be analyzed 
together in order to evaluate a microbank’s social returns. This suggests that microbanks with 
an international director tend to have smaller average loans, that is, social performance (or 
outreach) is increased. Being internationally initiated has conflicting results for social 
performance, in that outreach is reduced for the rural market regression, but outreach is 
increased for gender bias. This is a result we show in Table 6 as well. International 
commercial and subsidized debts both promote outreach to the rural market, as well as 
subsidized debt for gender bias. Last, being a member of an international network reduces the 
microbank’s presence in the rural market. 
The contrast between Table 7 and Table 8 is further underlined by the summary 
statistics at the bottom of each table. We see that the financial performance variables have 
high correlations in residuals and that the Breusch-Pagan test of independence shows rejection 
at a high significance level. The high correlations imply that little is gained by running these 
regressions together - over and beyond what single dependent variable regressions provide. 
One financial performance variable is a close substitute for another. This is not the case for 
the social performance variables. They have low correlations, but the Breusch-Pagan test 
rejects independence between the variables. This means that they should be run together, so 
that the SUR regressions can take account of the interdependence between the social 
performance variables. Furthermore, we see that an F-test of importance of the international 
variables for performance is rejected for the financial performance variables, but not for the 
social. Thus, international influence variables play a fundamentally different role for the 
financial and the social performance variables.  
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5.4. Discussion  
What can we learn from these results? First of all, we interpret the results as an 
indicator that international influence (typically from the developed economies) is more 
concerned about the social performance than the financial performance of microbanks. These 
results are particularly interesting in relation to the microfinance schism debate in the industry 
(Morduch 2000). Specifically, some argue that a more profit seeking microfinance industry is 
better able to serve the poorest members of the community, since their profit motive leads 
them to be more efficient and more willing to seek out new markets for their loan products 
(Christen and Drake, 2002; Rhyne 1998). Others argue that a more commercialized 
microbank will drift away from the poor customer segment (Woller et al. 1999; Woller 2002). 
Even when most microbanks struggle to become self sufficient and often depend on donor 
support (Microbanking Bulletin, 2007), the international influence seems to enhance social 
over financial returns. These results are also stable across for-profit and non-profit 
microbanks (not reported). Recent evidence presented by Hermes et al. (forthcoming) 
indicates that there is a trade-off between servicing the poorest customers and being 
financially sustainable. Thus, by focusing more on social returns the international actors are at 
the same time promoting a less financially sustainable industry. International subsidies over 
the longer term might thus be needed.    
The empirical tests reveal that an international initiator does enhance accounting 
performance (ROA) and operational self-sufficiency (OSS) – as suggested by hypothesis 1. 
The sign remains positive but is no longer significant when numbers are adjusted for subsidies 
(using the FSS measure) – thus rejecting hypothesis 1 in relation to financial performance. We 
argue that is due to easier access to subsidies by microbanks with an international initiator. 
Furthermore, since the sign remains positive in the FSS regression, it might also be that the 
historical ties with the initiator may bring along transfer of skills and competencies – in line 
with arguments from resource based theory. However, no other positive significant financial 
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effect is found from international influence. In fact, there appears to be one significant 
negative effect from international directors – as increased monitoring by an international 
director apparently reduce operational self sufficiency.  This seems to imply that the 
international director does show up as a cost factor in the microbank (Mersland and Strøm, 
2009). Thus, taken together, the results indicate that international influence does not enhance 
microbanks’ financial performance and that some forms of internationalization, like 
directorship, might actually induce higher costs. This should be a concern for policy makers 
and international actors.  
 The findings - that an international initiator enhances social performance, increases 
outreach to women and decreases rural outreach - make practical sense (supporting hypothesis 
1 for social performance). Since many of the international actors active in initiating 
microbanks are concerned with exit strategies, they might be willing to trade off rural 
outreach (which can be costly) with financial results. Likewise, the positive sign on average 
loan size supports such a trade-off hypothesis. Also, since servicing women does not bring 
along additional costs (D’Espallier et al. 2009a) and can enhance repayment (D’Espallier et 
al. 2009b), it is not surprising that international initiators enhance female outreach. 
The finding that international initiators do not enhance rural outreach may have an 
additional explanation to the trade-off hypothesis. Since initiating a microbank in most cases 
requires ex-pats and frequent field visits from an international head office, it is more 
comfortable to provide services in and around urban areas. That membership in an 
international network likewise reduces rural outreach supports our “comfort” hypothesis, 
since frequent visits from international experts and supporters are common in these types of 
microbanks. 
The finding that debt holders enhance rural outreach demonstrates that the 
international community is concerned with rural outreach (supporting hypothesis 2a and 2b 
for social performance in terms of rural outreach), and to some lenders even exist as a 
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requirement (www.mixmarket.org). Since providing debt requires no, or little, rural 
monitoring by an international investor, compared to initiating a microbank or being a 
member in an international network, an international lender may be more effective in assuring 
rural outreach.  
The reason that subsidized lenders are concerned with female outreach (supporting 
hypothesis 2a and 2b for social performance in terms of female outreach), is probably because 
several of these international lenders specifically want microbanks to target female clients 
(www.mixmarket.org). 
Taken together, the empirical tests do not support the notion that commercial debt and 
subsidized debt enhance financial performance (rejecting hypothesis 2a and 2b – for financial 
performance). However, we find that both commercial and subsidized debt provide higher 
social performance – as discussed above. This implies that we need to differentiate between 
the effects from international debt on social versus financial performance and that 
international lenders are indeed concerned with the social part of microfinance (Reille and 
Foster, 2008).  
Our tests show that international directorship (from the “global North”) has a negative 
effect on financial performance (but only with respect to operational self sufficiency) – but 
enhance social performance (reduce average loan size). Thus hypothesis 3 is rejected for 
financial performance, and partly supported as it relates to social performance. One 
explanation might be that such board members are more motivated by the social performance 
– and enhance organizational governance to such ends. Moreover, international directors 
might bring along a culture of higher costs (Mersland and Strøm, 2009) and their focus on 
reaching poorer customers increases the microbank’s costs (Mersland and Strøm, 2010) and 
thereby reduces its financial performance.  
33% of the microbanks in our sample are members of well known international 
networks. Our data reveals that such membership enhances social performance (more focus 
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on women and rural areas) - but not financial performance. Thus hypothesis 4 is rejected as it 
relates to financial performance, but supported as relates to social performance. We argue that 
the positive effect on social performance can be attributed to better transfer of knowledge and 
“best practices”, and/or due to better monitoring of management - as poor social performance 
could potentially exclude the microbank from the network.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study reveals that key dimensions of internationalization affect microbank 
performance – however – mostly related to their social performance. Our overall conclusion is 
that more internationally influenced microbanks are performing socially better and financially 
equal with mere domestic connected microbanks.  
This study is of particular importance – as it contradicts a commonly held view in the 
microfinance industry. It is common to assume that international influence is only a 
“necessary evil” – and that such influence should only be a stepping stone on the route to an 
independent domestic market solution. Our interpretation is that microbanks can accrue long 
term benefits from international involvement. The finding that international influence mostly 
affects the social performance of the microbank, is of importance in the ongoing schism 
debate in the industry (Morduch, 2000; Hermes et al., forthcoming) as it indicates that 
international actors might influence the trade-off between financial and social results. This 
could bring about a reassessment of the role of international actors. In an industry where most 
microbanks struggle to become financially viable, international actors are not only needed as 
social watchdogs. There is certainly a need for influence which can enhance the microbank’s 
financial performance. Further research should address more closely which activities these 
international actors provide that are able to influence microbanks’ performance. Moreover, 
new research should look further into how local stakeholders can and should balance the twin 
microfinance goals of social outreach and financial sustainability. 
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The scope (up to six years of data), breadth (73 countries) and rigor of this study 
(microbank-specific control variables, multiple country and region controls, as well as control 
for year effects), make us confident that our results are well founded. We also argue that our 
hypotheses are supported by agency theory and resource based theory. Besides, bringing in 
the SUR technique allowing us to measuring the multi-dimensions of social performance 
simultaneously, is novel in the microfinance literature. There are of course limitations to this 
study. First, we are using proxies for important variables, such as three measures of social 
performance – even though all of them – especially average loan size and women outreach -  
are key performance variables used by major agents (i.e., World Bank). Second, the direction 
of causation could potentially be reversed (with the exception of the exogenously given 
international initiator) – as more successful microbanks are able to recruit international board 
members, hold international debt, or be members of international networks. However, such 
international network membership normally comes early in a microbank’s life – and with few 
exits – so it can most likely be treated as exogenous. Third, future research could go further 
into a broader set of indicators of social impact, and finally, this study does not address the 
underlying processes of why internationalization leads to higher performance.    
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Table 1: Variables included in the study: 
Variables Explanation/definition Hypotheses: 
 
 Dependent variables included in the study  
Financial 
Performance:  
 
 
ROA Operational net income divided on average annual assets and adjusted 
for country inflation  
OSS  Total operating revenues divided by total administrative and financial 
expenses.  
FSS Total operating revenues divided by total administrative and financial 
expenses, adjusted for donations, low-interest loans and inflation.   
   
Social 
Performance: 
 
 
Average loan Average outstanding loan per loan client  
Rural/urban 
market 
Whether or not the microbank focus on only urban (1), rural and urban 
(2) or only rural areas (3)  
Gender bias Whether or not the microbank consciously target female clients Yes = 1, No = 0  
   
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Independent variables included in the study  
International 
initiator 
Whether or not the microbank was initiated by an international 
organization  
Yes = 1, No = 0 
+ 
Member 
international 
network 
Whether or not microbank is a member of an international microfinance 
network 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
+ 
International 
board members 
Number of international board members  
+ 
International 
commercial debt 
Whether or not the microbank holds international commercial debt 
Yes = 1, No = 0 + 
International 
subsidized debt 
Whether or not the microbank holds international subsidized debt 
Yes = 1, No = 0 + 
Microbank 
control 
variables 
Microbank level control variables included in the study 
  
Microbank 
experience 
The years since the microbank started microfinance operations 
 
Ownership type Whether or not the microbank is a shareholder firm (SHF) 
Yes = 1, No = 0  
Assets The natural logarithm of the microbank’s assets  
Portfolio at Risk The fraction of the loan portfolio being 30 days or more overdue 
 
   
Country 
variables 
Country level control variables included in the study 
 
 
Heritage Index The Heritage Foundation index of the yearly economic freedom in the 
country  
Region Latin 
America 
Countries from Latin America 
 
Region Africa Countries from Africa south of Sahara  
Region MENA Countries from Middle East and North Africa  
Region EECA Countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia  
Region Asia Countries from Asia and the Pacific  
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Table 2: Comparing data from Mix-market and rating reports (this data) 
 
Mix-market (2006) 
704 microbanks 
 
 
Rating reports 
379 microbanks 
 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median
Age (years) 12 9 9 7
Total assets US$ 45,566,650 6,169,918 10,536,188 3,076,135
Total staff # 400 94 83 45
# Active loan clients 73564 10102 12,483 4,831
Gross loan portfolio US$ 33,072,688 4,438,677 3,976,827 1,727,960
Average outstanding loan US$ 1026 456 942 479
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Avg. Std. Min Max Obs 
Dependent variables      
Return on assets (ROA) 0.005 0.125 -0.990 0.342 1239 
Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) 1.131 0.379 0.076 2.949 754 
Financial Self-sufficiency (FSS) 0.936 0.307 0.064 2.210 735 
Average loan (US$) 942 2252 2.490 28694 1234 
Rural/urban market 1.981 0.767 1.000 3.000 366 
Gender bias 0.438 0.497 0.000 1.000 372 
      
International dimensions:      
International initiator 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 288 
International commercial debt 0.406 0.491 0.000 1.000 257 
International subsidised debt 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000 257 
International director 0.558 1.201 0.000 6.000 217 
International network member 0.328 0.471 0.000 1.000 290 
      
Microbank specific control variables:      
Microbank experience 9.163 7.329 -2.000 79.000 999 
SHF (ownership type) 0.284 0.452 0.000 1.000 289 
Assets (size) 14.879 1.365 9.856 19.337 977 
Portfolio at risk (30 days) 0.068 0.102 0.000 0.980 910 
Country control variables:      
Latin America  0.327 0.469 0.000 1.000 290 
Africa south 0.234 0.424 0.000 1.000 290 
Middle East/Northern Africa 0.083 0.276 0.000 1.000 290 
EECA 0.207 0.406 0.000 1.000 290 
HDI-country index 0.684 0.120 0.338 0.863 274 
Notice that categorical variables have far fewer observations than the continuous. These are assumed constant for the four years of 
observations for each microbank. 
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Table 4: Bivariate Pearson correlations among dependent variables and the 
international explanatory variables. Panel A gives correlations for financial performance 
variables, panel B for social performance variables. Correlations are performed for case 
averages. The number of observations are shown below the coefficients. Significant 
correlations at the 5% level are bold, at the 1% level bold and slanted. 
Panel A    International 
    initia- comm subs. dir- 
 ROA OSS FSS tor debt debt ectors 
OSS 0.763       
 239       
FSS 0.696 0.854      
 250 231      
Initiator 0.002 0.096 0.008     
 365 245 250     
Comm.debt 0.126 0.091 0.144 0.060    
 331 239 244 339    
Subs.debt -0.031 -0.084 -0.080 0.147 0.081   
 331 240 244 338 324   
Directors 0.025 -0.067 -0.037 0.450 0.204 0.062  
 248 199 194 252 234 233  
Network 0.055 0.090 0.050 0.313 0.114 0.151 0.290 
 366 246 250 375 339 338 253 
 
Panel B    International 
 Avg.   initia- comm subs. dir- 
 loan Rural Gender tor debt debt Ectors 
Rural 0.005       
 358       
Gender -0.190 -0.037      
 364 360      
Initiator 0.001 0.004 0.147     
 368 363 369     
Comm.debt -0.051 -0.013 -0.095 0.060    
 334 330 336 339    
Subs.debt -0.013 0.071 0.148 0.147 0.081   
 333 329 335 338 324   
Directors -0.036 0.006 -0.030 0.450 0.204 0.062  
 249 243 248 252 234 233  
Network -0.064 -0.098 0.207 0.313 0.114 0.151 0.290 
 369 364 370 375 339 338 253 
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Table 5: Single measures of financial performance as dependent variables: Return on 
assets (ROA), operational self-sufficiency (OSS), and financial self-sufficiency (FSS) 
 Return on Assets OSS FSS 
Constant -0.027 1.430*** 0.994*** 
International dimensions: 
 
  
International initiator 0.024* 0.116** 0.053 
International commercial debt 0.010 -0.006 0.023 
International subsidised debt -0.001 -0.032 0.003 
International director -0.018 -0.279** -0.125 
International network member -0.003 0.073 0.046 
MFI specific control variables: 
 
  
MFI experience 0.001 -0.008** -0.002 
SHF (ownership type) -0.002 -0.034 -0.039 
Portfolio at risk (30 days) -0.077 -0.004 -0.535*** 
Assets (size) 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
Country control variables:    
Inflation -0.122*** -0.430** -0.469*** 
GDP/cap. PPP adjusted 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
GDP growth -0.030*** -0.041 0.023 
Current account  -0.002 -0.022 -0.014 
Heritage index 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
Latin America -0.004 0.059 -0.017 
Africa south -0.001 -0.092 -0.084 
Middle East/Northern Africa -0.025 -0.074 -0.024 
EECA -0.013 -0.074 -0.125 
Year dummies       
Overall R2 0.088 0.143 0.216 
N  712 585   554 
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Table 6: Single measures of social performance as dependent variables: Average loan 
size, main market (rural vs. urban), and gender bias 
 Average loan Gender Bias Rural 
Constant 1 2.986*** -5.985*** -1.027
Constant 2   1.537
International dimensions:   
 
International initiator 0.283 1.357*** -0.291
International commercial debt -0.341 -0.493 0.197
International subsidised debt 0.282 0.622* 0.136
International director -1.222 0.487 0.285
International network member -0.385 0.699* -0.663**
MFI specific control variables:   
 
MFI experience 0.000 -0.029 0.021
SHF (ownership type) 0.580 -2.580*** 0.509
Portfolio at risk (30 days) -1.437* -1.951 -0.883
Assets (size) 0.018** 0.000** 0.000
Country control variables:   
Inflation 0.199 -0.970 -0.139
GDP/cap. PPP adjusted 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
GDP growth -0.341 0.645 0.935
Current account  -0.014 -0.095 0.045
Heritage index -0.012 0.087*** -0.022
Latin America -0.774 1.555** 0.589
Africa South -1.125* 2.186*** 1.733***
Middle East/Northern Africa -0.215 2.291** 1.980**
EECA -0.165 -0.270 1.932***
Year dummies     
Overall R2 0.105 0.271 0.125
N  705  710  699
 
The regression with “Rural” as dependent variable is done with ordered logistic regression, 
where a higher value indicates a more rural market. The regression with “Gender” as 
dependent variable is done with logistic regression, where the value of 1 indicates that the 
MFI has a gender bias in its lending practice. In both regressions year dummies are included. 
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Table 7: Financial performance: Joint estimation of international influence and control 
variables. 512 observations. 
 ROA OSS FSS 
Constant 0.016*** 1.464*** 1.034*** 
International dimensions:  
  
International initiator 0.031** 0.125** 0.054 
International commercial debt 0.001 -0.008 0.016 
International subsidised debt -0.002 -0.013 0.006 
International director -0.039 -0.242** -0.118 
International network member -0.003 0.062 0.049 
MFI specific control variables:    
MFI experience 0.000 -0.007*** -0.001 
SHF (ownership type) 0.007 -0.048 -0.035 
Assets (size) 0.001* 0.005*** 0.004*** 
Portfolio at risk (30 days) -0.088** -0.187 -0.729*** 
Country control variables:    
Inflation -0.067 -0.271 -0.547*** 
GDP/cap. PPP adjusted 0.003 0.009 0.004 
GDP growth 0.020 -0.302 -0.114 
Current account  -0.003 -0.013 -0.010 
Heritage index 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
Latin America 0.019 0.052 -0.004 
Africa South 0.013 -0.059 -0.058 
Middle East/Northern Africa 0.007 -0.068 0.024 
EECA -0.011 -0.100 -0.122** 
Overall R2 0.157 0.878 0.887 
N 512     
Correlations of residuals: ROA OSS  
OSS 0.759   
FSS 0.688 0.817  
Breusch-Pagan chi-sq(3) 0.000     
F-test international variables 0.210   
The Breusch-Pagan test is an examination that the dependent variables are independent. A low 
value rejects the independence hypothesis. 
The F-test is an exclusion test of the hypothesis that the international variables as a group 
have no impact upon the dependent variables. A low value rejects the hypothesis of no impact 
as a group. 
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Table 8: Social performance: Joint estimation of international influence and control variables. 
512 observations 
 Average    
 loan Rural Gender 
Constant 5.986*** 2.394*** -0.607* 
International dimensions:    
International initiator 0.354 -0.294*** 0.249*** 
International commercial debt -0.487 0.165*** -0.047 
International subsidised debt 0.433 0.168*** 0.110*** 
International director -2.330*** 0.082 0.026 
International network member -0.348 -0.163** 0.061 
MFI specific control variables:    
MFI experience -0.007 0.004 -0.006* 
SHF (ownership type) 1.169** 0.340*** -0.348*** 
Portfolio at risk (30 days) 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 
Assets (size) -1.184 -0.090 -0.106 
Country control variables:    
Inflation 0.342 -0.022 -0.104 
GDP/cap. PPP adjusted -0.134** 0.000** 0.000*** 
GDP growth -3.171 0.212 -0.533 
Current account  -0.011 0.001 -0.006 
Heritage index -0.032 -0.009** 0.011*** 
Latin America -0.923 0.024 0.359*** 
Africa South -1.311** 0.300*** 0.437*** 
Middle East/Northern Africa 0.043 0.440*** 0.463 
EECA -0.227 0.437*** 0.053 
Overall R2 0.194 0.908 0.571 
N 512     
Correlations  Average   
of residuals: loan Rural  
Rural 0.064   
Gender -0.119 0.047  
Breusch-Pagan chi-sq(3) 0.015     
F-test international variables 0.000   
 
 
 
